Steven L Martinez

Baffled by Dafl: The History and Future of the Directive Authority for Logistics Steven L Martinez

Publisher Marketing: Most observers of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM agree that the conduct of major combat operations were successful. However, when experts analyze the logistical performance of U. S. Central Command and other components of the U. S. armed forces, many critiques arise. Numerous anecdotes of less-than-satisfactory support given to combat units can be found, from the lack of spare parts experienced by ground forces driving into the heart of Iraq to the inability to more effectively coordinate intratheater distribution, that clearly indicate room for improvement. The fact that some of these same criticisms were made in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 suggests that, while we may have learned from our mistakes in the past, we have not effected the necessary changes in our logistics operations to avoid repeating them. This paper explores this topic first by addressing the various sources of guidance-- doctrinal and directive, joint and service--that stipulate how joint logistics is to be conducted. Then, three main areas of joint logistics operations are discussed: visibility, distribution, and communications/information technology capabilities. For these issues, a brief historical analysis of their effectiveness in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM is provided. Lastly, conclusions for each aspect will be drawn and recommendations offered for improving these shortcomings in the future.